Liberty University Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 3

Article 4

December 2012

The Art of Ecclesiastical War: Using the Legal System to Resolve
Church Disputes
Mark A. Hicks

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review

Recommended Citation
Hicks, Mark A. (2012) "The Art of Ecclesiastical War: Using the Legal System to Resolve Church Disputes,"
Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 6 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol6/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars
Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholars
Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu.

COMMENT
THE ART OF ECCLESIASTICAL WAR: USING THE LEGAL
SYSTEM TO RESOLVE CHURCH DISPUTES
Mark A. Hickst
I. INTRODUCTION

"Greetings in the powerful and unchanging name of Jesus Christ." This
was the salutation of a letter in which a church defamed its Pastor.' In the
letter, which was read aloud to the church congregation, the church falsely
accused the Pastor of misappropriating church funds, and then closed by
saying, "[w]here it is not the intention of the district [church] to harm
anyone's personal reputation, it is sometimes important to bring difficult
issues to the light, so that nothing will hinder the future work of the
church."' The Pastor was further defamed in an email sent from a leader of
the denomination with which the church was affiliated to a Church
secretary: "[The Pastor] may just be wanting to stir up trouble . . . [h]e has
already demonstrated a willingness to lie and steal, and to purposely sow
discord among the division."' According to the Pastor, the Church's
defamation "ruined his reputation and left him nearly destitute."' An
Oregon jury agreed with the Pastor, and awarded him $355,000 in damages
for his defamation claim.' The Pastor's case is indicative of a growing
number of cases in the legal system that revolve around church disputes.

t Editor-in-Chief, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEw, Volume 6; Juris Doctor, Liberty
University School of Law, 2012; B.S. Government, Liberty University, 2009. I thank my Dad
for being an example of Godly leadership, taking a stand for truth in the face of hatred, and
standing by me. I thank my Mom for her unwavering love and support. I thank my brother
for being my best friend and being there for me when I need it the most. I thank my sister for
her unique way of making me laugh and for calling me out when it is needed. I thank the
staff of the Law Review for their hard work and attention to detail. I thank Dan Schmid,
Phillip Marbuy, and Jennifer Gregorin for their friendship and for putting up with me for
three years. Finally, I thank my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. I hope this Comment awakens
the Church-we must be a light in the darkness, not a cancer that destroys.
1. John Gibeaut, First Amendment Rites, ABA JOURNAL, (June 1, 2010, 1:40 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/first-amendment-rites/.
2. Tubra v. Cooke, 225 P.3d 862, 866 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
3. Gibeaut, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and Jews all have one thing in common:
they are all members of an organized religion. Within organized religion,
there are churches, which, in the broadest sense, consist of groups of
individual adherants gathering together for the purpose of their faith. This
Comment focuses on church disputes within the religion of Christianity.
Church disputes are a type of war.' This type of war does not involve armed
conflict with guns, tanks, warships, and airplanes; instead, the weapons of
this war are words. In church disputes, the tongue-or pen-is truly
mightier than the sword.'
This Comment proposes that the legal system should be used to
objectively resolve church disputes. This Comment's basic thesis will be
developed in three subsequent parts. Part II lays the foundation for the
thesis by examining the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, and the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence interpreting those Clauses. Part III
examines and defines the problem of church disputes. Finally, Part IV
proposes a new approach to biblical dispute resolution, a restatement of the
Supreme Court's neutral principles of law test, and an alternative to the
legal system for the resolution of church disputes.
II. BACKGROUND
To lay a proper foundation for the use of the legal system in church
disputes, the background section of the article is divided into three sections.
The first section examines the definitions of religion and church as used in
the legal system. The second section briefly discusses the history of the First
Amendment. The third section analyzes the Supreme Court's church
dispute jurisprudence.

6. These four religions represent the largest percentage of religions in the United
States. The percentages break down as follows: "Protestant 51.3%, Roman Catholic 23.9%,
Mormon 1.7%, other Christian 1.6%, Jewish 1.7%, Buddhist 0.7%, Muslim 0.6%, other or
unspecified 2.5%, unaffiliated 12.1%, none 4%." The World Factbook:North America, United
States, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/us.html (last updated April 4, 2012).
7. War is defined as "[a] dispute or competition between adversaries." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1720 (Deluxe 9th ed. 2009).

8. In the words of Rosencrantz: "[M]any wearing rapiers are afraid of goosequils."
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET 49 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 1904).
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A. Defining "Religion" and "Church"
Courts frequently use the terms religion and church in their opinions.
However, the terms are not easily defined.' The Supreme Court's definition
of religion has evolved over the past two hundred years, and no clear
definition of church has yet been pronounced.'o The First Amendment
includes the term religion." To properly interpret the First Amendmentspecifically, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clausereligion must be defined. 2 Many state and federal laws use the term
church." To properly interpret and understand the state and federal laws, as
well as court decisions interpreting the laws, church must also be defined.'"
1. The Definition of Religion
Religion is a broad category that is defined as "[a] system of faith and
worship usu. involving belief in a supreme being and usu. containing a
moral or ethical code; esp., such a system recognized and practiced by a
particular church, sect, or denomination."" Church disputes have provided
our legal system ample opportunity to refine the way we define religion and
have even given the Supreme Court a chance to evaluate and qualify a
variety of viewpoints as religions.
In Davis v. Beason, 6 the Supreme Court stated that religion "has
reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the
obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of
9. For a discussion of the difficulty of defining religion, see generally Stephen A. Boyan,
Defining Religion in Operationaland Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479 (1968); Jesse
H. Choper, DefiningReligion in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579; Note, Toward
a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056 (1978).
10. See infra Part II.A.1.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also infra Part II.B.
12. Usually, a term has a generally accepted meaning. This is not the case with the term
religion. Therefore, the Supreme Court's definition of religion, as developed over the past
two hundred years, must be discussed in order to properly interpret the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment.
13. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Code frequently uses the term church. See, e.g., 26
U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (2010) (charitable giving limitations); id. at § 403(b)(9) (church
retirement income accounts); id. at § 512 (unrelated business taxable income); id. at § 514
(unrelated debt-financed income).
14. In Guam Power Authority v. Bishop of Guam, the court discussed the definitional
problem of the term church: "[church] can mean an organization for religious purposes. It
can also have the more physical meaning of a place where persons regularly assemble for
worship." 383 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D. Guam 1974) (internal citations omitted).
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (Deluxe 9th ed. 2009).
16. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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obedience to his will."" After the Davis decision, numerous lower courts
adopted the same-or a substantially similar-understanding of religion.18
The term religion was eventually given a broader definition by Judge Hand
in the Second Circuit case, United States v. Kauten:"9
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as
a means of relating the individual to his fellow-men .

. .

. It is a

belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically
requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to
accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets....
. . . [Conscientious objection] may justly be regarded as a
response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it a
conscience or God, that is for many persons at the present time
the equivalent of what has always been thought a religious
impulse.2 0
Judge Hand's expansion of the definition of religion to include beliefs of
conscience as well as beliefs in God was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Torasco v. Watkins.2 1 Additionally, in Torasco, the Court explained that the
definition of religion is not necessarily based upon a conception of God.22
Finally, in Welsh v. United States,23 the Supreme Court stated that moral
and ethical beliefs are synonymous with religion:
17. Id at 342.
18. See, e.g., Borchert v. City of Ranger, 42 F. Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. Tex. 1941)
(referencing Webster's Dictionary and defining religion as "[d]evotion or fidelity, as to a
principle or practice; scrupulous conformity; conscientiousness; deep attachment like that
felt for an object of worship"); Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391, 393 (Cal. App. 1938)
(citing to and incorporating the exact language of Beason); Sunday Sch. Bd. of the S. Baptist
Convention v. McCue, 293 P.2d 234, 237 (Kan. 1956) (referencing Webster's Dictionary and
defining religion as "an apprehension, awareness or conviction of the existence of a supreme
being controlling one's destiny"); Nicholls v. Mayor of Lynn, 7 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1937)
(citing to and incorporating the exact language of Beason); Taylor v. State, 11 So. 2d 663, 673
(Miss. 1943) (citing to and incorporating the exact language of Beason); Kolbeck v. Kramer,
202 A.2d 889, 891 (N.J. Super. 1964) (citing to and incorporating the exact language of
Beason); Drozda v. Bassos, 23 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (1940) (citing to and incorporating the exact
language of Beason).
19. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
20. Id.
21. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,495 (1961).
22. Id. at 495 & n.11 (explaining that "[a]mong religions in this country which do not
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others").
23. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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Most of the great religions of today and of the past have
embodied the idea of a Supreme Being or a Supreme Reality -a
God-who communicates to man in some way a consciousness
of what is right and should be done, of what is wrong and
therefore should be shunned. If an individual deeply and
sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source
and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of
conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time,
those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a
place parallel to that filled by God" in traditionally religious
persons. Because his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such
an individual is as much entitled to a "religious" conscientious
objector exemption . . . as is someone who derives his

conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious
convictions.24
2.

The Definition of Church

Church can best be described as a religious corporation, which,
according to Black's Law Dictionary, is "created to carry out some
ecclesiastical or religious purpose."25 Congress, however, has not defined the
term church.26 Congress consistently uses the term church in legislation, but
it leaves the interpretation of the term to administrative agencies such as the
Internal Revenue Service.27

24. Id. at 340.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 394 (Deluxe 9th ed. 2009).
26. For a discussion of Congress and its decision not to define church, see Charles M.
Whelan, Church in the Internal Revenue Code, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1977).
27. Id. Additionally, since Congress has not defined church, the courts have been left
free to develop their own definitions. See, e.g., Twin-City Bible Church v. Zoning Bd. of
App., 365 N.E.2d 1381, 1382, 1384 (Ill. 1977) (holding that the term "church" includes the
use of a residential home for meetings and religious education classes); Synod of Chesapeake,
Inc. v. Newark, 254 A.2d 611, 612-14 (Del. 1969) (holding that a residential home could be
used for religious gathering, and, under those circumstances, constituted a "church"); Bd. of
Zoning App. v. Wheaton, 76 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ind. 1948) (holding that a priest's home and
the living quarters for nuns were "an integral part of any Roman Catholic church project");
Cmty. Synagogue v. Bates, 136 N.E.2d 488, 488-89 (1956) (holding a large piece of land with
a home used for youth activities and as a synagogue qualified as a church); City of Concord
v. New Testament Baptist Church, 382 A.2d 377, 380 (N.H. 1978) (holding that "a school
may be considered as an integral and inseparable part of a church").
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The Internal Revenue Service created a list of criteria that must be
examined to determine whether an organization is a church.28 These criteria
are:
1. A distinct legal existence;
2. A recognized creed and form of worship;
3. A definite and distinct ecclesiastical government;
4. A formal code of doctrine and discipline;
5. A distinct religious history;
6. A membership not associated with any other church or
denomination;
7. An organization of ordained ministers;
8. Ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed
duties;
9. A literature of its own;
10. Established places of worship;
11. Regular congregations;
12. Regular religious services;
13. Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young;
14. Schools for the preparation of its ministers. 9
In American Guidance Foundationv. United States,30 a federal district court
adopted the IRS criteria.3 1 However, it is important to note that the tax code
does not have a definition of church-the criteria are only used as a guide to
determine whether the organization is a church.32
A church can function under one of two organizational patterns: a
corporation or an unincorporated association. 3 An unincorporated
association is defined in Barr v. United Methodist Church 4 as "(1) a group
whose members share a common purpose, and (2) who function under a
common name under circumstances where fairness requires the group be
recognized as a legal entity."" Unincorporated churches do not have a legal
existence; thus, they cannot own or transfer property, cannot make or enter

28. See Speech of Jerome Kurtz, IRS Commissioner, at PLI Seventh Biennial Conference
on Tax Planning, Jan. 9, 1978, reprintedin 9 FEDERAL TAXES (P-H) 5 54,820 (1978).
29. Am. Guidance Found. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304, 306 n.2 (D.D.C. 1980).
30. Am. GuidanceFound., 490 F. Supp. 304.
31. Id. at 306 n.2.
32. See Whelan, supra note 26, at 887.
33. 2 RICHARD R. HAMMAR, PASTOR, CHURCH, & LAW § 6, at 51 (2007).
34. Barr v. United Methodist Church, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
35. Id. at 328.

THE ART OF ECCLESIASTICAL WAR

2012]1

537

into contracts, and are not able to sue or be sued. 6 Additionally, the
members of the organization are held personally liable for acts committed
during the course of the organization's business." Many states have created
laws that counteract these "unincorporated disabilities."" Nevertheless, in
states where the disability still exists, the organization may "act only
through its membership." 9
For a church to properly exist as a legal organization without the
disabilities of being unincorporated, it must incorporate.40 The procedures
for incorporation can vary from state to state.4 The most common model
for church incorporation, adopted by many states, is the Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act.42 The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act sets forth the
procedures for incorporation.43 The procedures require application to the
secretary of state, who reviews the articles of incorporation to ensure
compliance, and then issues a certificate of incorporation to the church."
Another method of incorporation for churches is through special state
statutes. 5 Most state statutes apply only to the large ecclesiastical bodies
such as the Roman Catholic Church. 6 However, New York, Michigan, and
New Jersey have statutes that include multiple denominational churches."
Another method of incorporation is through the court." Some states
allow incorporation through submitting incorporation documents-such as
articles of incorporation and articles of agreement-to a local court. 9 The
court then determines the validity of the request and issues incorporation
documents.so Finally, even if a church does not comply with the technical
requirements of incorporation, it may be considered a "de facto"
corporation." In order for a church to be a "de facto" corporation, it must
36. 2 HAMMAR, supra note 33, § 6-01, at 52.
37. Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 1499, 1506 (1973).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1510.
2 HAMMAR, supra note 33, § 6-01, at 54.
Id. § 6-02, at 62.
Id. § 6-02, at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 6-02.1, at 72.
Id.
See Kauper, supra note 37, at 1534 & n.175.
2 HAMMAR, supra note 33, § 6-02.1, at 73.
Id.

50. Id.

51. Id. § 6-02.1, at 76.

538

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:531

comply with the following three requirements: "(1) A special act or general
law under which a corporation may lawfully exist, (2) a bonafide attempt to
organize under the law and colorable compliance with the statutory
requirements, and (3) actual user or exercise of corporate powers in
pursuance of such law or attempted organization."S2
Once incorporated, the church must develop rules for its internal
operation. One court stated, "It has been uniformly held that religious
organizations have the right to prescribe such rules and regulations as to the
conduct of their own affairs as they may think proper, so long as the same
are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the law of the land."" The
best form of organization is for the church to have a corporate charter that
states the purposes and beliefs of the church and then to create rules for
internal operation known as bylaws." A court has held, "Religious and
quasi-religious societies may adopt a constitution and laws for the
regulation of their affairs, if conformable and subordinate to the charter and
not repugnant to the law of the land.... "5'Bylaws play a very important
role in the development of a church, and they must be adopted to protect
the church's operation. In Fellowship Tabernacle, Inc. v. Baker," the court
ruled that the church's bylaws played an important role in its decision.
The court said,
[T]he jury was asked to determine if the reasons the board listed
were, in fact, why the church fired Baker and whether that action
was proper under the church's own bylaws. The bylaws were not
simply church rules governing religious doctrine and policy, but
were, rather, the bylaws of an Idaho non-profit corporation
governing its corporate affairs.60
Now that the church has been defined, and the organization and structure
of the church has been set forth, it is necessary to look at the development
of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.
52. See Tr. of Peninsular Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Spencer,
183 A.2d 588, 592 (Del. 1962).
53. 2 HAMMAR, supra note 33, at § 6-02.2, 76.
54. Ohio Se. Conference of Evangelical United Brethren Church v. Kruger, 243 N.E.2d
781, 787 (Ct. Corn. Pl. of Ohio 1968).
55. 2 HAMMAR, supra note 33, § 6-02.1, at 79-80.
56. Leeds v. Harrison, 87 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1952).
57. See 2 HAMMAR, supra note 33, § 6-02.1, at 80.
58. Fellowship Tabernacle, Inc. v. Baker, 869 P.2d 578 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
59. Id. at 583.
60. Id.
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B. The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment
The Constitution of the United States does not address religions or
churches. 6 ' Nevertheless, the last sentence of the last clause in Article VI
says, "[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States." 62 This no-religious test
clause became the subject for debate in the various state conventions
because of the concern that it was tantamount to a declaration of a purely
secular society.6' The greater concern, however, was that the Constitution
did not protect the rights of citizens from infringement by the federal
government."
After the ratification of the Constitution, the first Congress created a list
of various drafts of the First Amendment on June 8, 1789.6' These drafts
help to discern Congress's purpose for the First Amendment.6 After

61. This is not to say that the word "religion" does not appear in the Constitution.
Instead, it demonstrates that religion was not a major concern of the Founding Fathers at the
Constitutional Convention. In fact, the Constitution has been referred to as a "Godless
Constitution." ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A
MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE 26-45 (2005).
62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2.
63. RONALD B. FLOWERS ET AL., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE SUPREME COURT 22 (2008).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 23.
66. Id.;
House Drafts[:] 1. The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor
shall the full and equal rights of conscience in any manner or on any pretext
infringed. 2. No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of
conscience be infringed. 3. Congress shall make no laws touching upon
religion, or infringing the rights of conscience. 4. Congress shall make no law
establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe on
the rights of conscience. 5. Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed. Senate Drafts[:] 6. Congress shall make no law establishing one
religious sect or society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of
conscience be infringed. 7. Congress shall not make any law, infringing the
rights of conscience, or establishing any Religious Sect or Society. 8. Congress
shall make no law establishing any particular denomination of religion in
preference to another, or prohibiting free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights
of conscience be infringed. 9. Congress shall make no law establishing religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 10. Congress shall make no law
establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free
exercise of religion.
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receiving the various drafts, Congress formed a House-Senate conference
committee to decide on the final language of the First Amendment.6 ' The
final version of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses says "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof....
As evidenced by the language of the drafts, "the framers appeared to have
consciously rejected efforts to adopt a narrow prohibition on religious
establishments." 69 Thus, the purpose of the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses was to "guard against any establishment at a national level.""o
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that "an important function
of the [Establishment] Clause was to 'make clear that Congress could not
interfere with state establishments.' The Clause, then, 'is best understood as
a federalism provision' that 'protects state establishments from federal
interference." 7. John Eidsmoe believes that the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment were designed to prevent the government from establishing a
national church and to protect the free exercise of religion within the
states.72 According to Greg Bahnsen, the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment simply "prohibited the establishment of one denomination as
the state church." Initially, the First Amendment limited the jurisdiction
of the federal government, but it did not limit the jurisdiction of the states
in religious matters.7 ' Before the Revolutionary War, eight of the thirteen
colonies established churches, and out of the remaining five colonies, four
established religions.7 ' Because of the inconsistencies among federal and
state laws concerning the establishment of religion, the Supreme Court
applied the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause to the states in Cantwell
v. Connecticut.7' The Supreme Court then applied the First Amendment
Establishment Clause to the states in Everson v. Board ofEducation.7
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 1-10 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
67. FLOWERS, supra note 63, at 23.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. FLOWERS, supra note 63, at 23.
70. Id. at 24.
71. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727-28 (2005) (quoting Elk Grove United Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004)(Thomas, J., concurring)).
72. JOHN EIDSMOE, THE CHRISTIAN LEGAL ADVISOR 134-35 (1984).
73. GREG BAHNSEN, BY THIS STANDARD 204 (2008).
74. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
75. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427-48 (1962).
76. Cantwell,310 U.S. at 303-04.
77. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947).
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C. The Supreme Court's Church Dispute Jurisprudence
In Watson v. Jones," the Supreme Court heard its first church dispute
case. The Court held that "whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith,
of ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest
church judicatory to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them .

..

The

Court said that civil courts, if they tried to decide "matters of faith,
discipline, and doctrine" . . . "would only involve themselves in a sea of
uncertainty and doubt which would do anything but improve either
religion or good morals." 0
Notably, in Watson, the Court did not base its decision upon the Free
Exercise Clause; instead, it based its decision on jurisdictional groundscourts do not have jurisdiction over religion." However, in 1952, the
78. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
79. Id. at 727. The Court explained this limitation:
All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this
government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved
by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to
establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that
those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance,
subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.
Nor do we see that justice would be likely to be promoted by submitting
those decisions to review in the ordinary judicial tribunals. Each of these large
and influential bodies (to mention no others, let reference be had to the
Protestant Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal, and the Presbyterian churches),
has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in
their written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of
precedents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of
ecclesiastical law and religious faith that tasks the ablest minds to become
familiar with. It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be
as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as
the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an
appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case,
to one which is less so.
Id. at 729.
80. Id. at 732.
81. The Court explained:
But it is a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and
purely ecclesiastical in its character, a matter over which the civil courts
exercise no jurisdiction, a matter which concerns theological controversy,
church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members
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Supreme Court held that Watson is also the standard for the Court's Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence.82 In Kedroff, the Court clarified the Watson
decision:
The opinion radiates, however, a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, and independence from secular control or
manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government as well as those
of faith and doctrine. [Freedom from government interference]
we think must now be said to have federal constitutional
protection as a part of the free exercise of religion."
The Court did not stop there: "the Supreme Court's basic constitutional
approach, established in three cases decided between 1969 and 1979, is that
secular courts must not determine questions of religious doctrine and
practice.""
The first case, PresbyterianChurch in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, involved local Georgia churches
withdrawing from the national church organization under the claim that

of the church to the standard of morals required of them, becomes the subject
of its action. It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction has been conferred
on the tribunal to try the particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it
exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that the laws of the church do not
authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and, in a sense often used
in the courts, all of those may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is
easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole
subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and
fundamental organization of every religious denomination may, and must, be
examined into with minuteness and care, for they would become, in almost
every case, the criteriaby which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be
determined in the civil court. This principle would deprive these bodies of the
right of construing their own church laws, would open the way to all the evils
which we have depicted as attendant upon the doctrine of Lord Eldon, and
would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where property rights were
concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions.
Id. at 733-34.
82. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952).
83. Id.
84. Kent Greenawalt, Hands Offi Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1843, 1844 (1998). The three cases are: Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 602 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and
Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708 (1976); and Presbyterian Church in the United
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
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the national organization departed from the doctrines of their affiliation."
Their withdrawal was because of a substantial dispute over doctrinal
issues.' The Court held that the issue raised a problem "of inhibiting the
free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests
in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern."" The Court went on to say that
neutral principles of law can be used to resolve disputes, but they must not
"resolve underlying controversies over religious doctrine.""
Seven years later, the Supreme Court heard another Free Exercise Clause
church dispute case." Milivojevich involved a hierarchical church, and the
dispute was over the dismissal of the Bishop of the church.o The Bishop
argued that his dismissal was arbitrary and contrary to church procedures."
The Supreme Court disagreed and applied the neutral principles of law
approach.92 Justice Brennan wrote that the neutral principles of law
approach applies to matters of church government as well as doctrine."
Justice Brennan went on to say that courts cannot assess church rules or
adjudicate between the different religious understandings.
Instead,
resolution must be made without an extensive inquiry by the courts, and if
it cannot be made without the inquiry, courts cannot rule against the
decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within the hierarchical
church." Justice Rehnquist dissented and wrote that the Court's decision to
defer to ecclesiastical decisions of religions that involve hierarchical
organizations would create "far more serious problems under the
Establishment Clause."96
In Jones v. Wolf,97 decided in 1979, the Supreme Court heard a case
involving a Presbyterian church that split.98 The split resulted in two unique
congregations." The minority congregation sued to maintain control of the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

PresbyterianChurch, 393 U.S. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 705.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 698, 709-10.
Id. at 709-10.
Id. at 710-11.
Id. at 724-25.
Id. at 734.
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 595 (1979).
Id. at 597.
Id. at 598.
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church property.o The lower court used the neutral principles approach
and found in favor of the majority congregation."0 ' The Supreme Court
upheld the Georgia court's application of the neutral principles standard.102
However, the court stated that if the church had established appropriate
provisions within the church's constitution or bylaws, then the court would
have been prohibited from ruling on the issue because it would have
involved "considerations of religious doctrine and polity.""0 3 In summation,
courts cannot answer questions that involve purely religious matters;
however, courts can answer questions that do not call for the interpretation
of purely religious matters.
The cases discussed above allow state courts a large variety of options
when adjudicating church disputes, and the Supreme Court, in all of the
cases, was split.'" Additionally, the Supreme Court has not revisited its Free
Exercise Clause church dispute jurisprudence in more than thirty years
since its decision in Wolf'os But the Supreme Court has revisited its Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence in two significant cases decided in 1990 and
2012: Employment Division v. Smith'o6 and Hosanna-Tabor.'o
D. Employment Division v. Smith: NeutralPrinciplesof Law Redux
In Smith, the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause in light
of government regulation of religious practices.' The petitioners were
Native Americans who were denied unemployment benefits because they
were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote during a religious
ceremony.' 9 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause was not
violated."o The Court ruled that the "right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).""'
100. Id. at 598-99.
101. Id. at 599.
102. Id. at 604-06.
103. Id. at 608.
104. See Greenawalt, supra note 84, at 1860.
105. See 4 HAMMAR, supra note 33, at § 9-07, 105. ("The most recent decision of the
Supreme Court came in 1979.").
106. Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
107. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
108. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
109. Id. at 874.
110. Id. at 890.
111. Id. at 879 (internal quotations marks omitted).
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Although Smith stands for the proposition that neutral laws of general
applicability cannot be avoided on free exercise grounds, it does not
necessarily apply to church dispute cases. The Court specifically
distinguished a government regulation of "physical acts"-such as the
regulation in Smith-from a government regulation that "lend[s] its power
to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or
dogma."" 2 But Smith does demonstrate the Supreme Court's continued use
of the neutral principles of law approach to Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence.
E. Hosanna-Tabor:The MinisterialException
Hosanna-Tabor represents the Supreme Court's most recent Free
Exercise Clause decision."' The case revolved around a church-operated
school's decision to terminate the employment of a teacher at the school." 4
The teacher alleged that her employment was terminated in violation of the
anti-discrimination provisions of the Americans with Disability Act."' The
question before the court was "whether the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment bar such an action when the employer is a
religious group and the employee is one of the group's ministers."" 6 The
court held that the First Amendment did bar such an action. 17
In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court acknowledged, for the first
time, the existence of a "ministerial exception""' to employment
112. Id. at 877.
113. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. V. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 694
(2012).
114. Id. at 699.
115. Id. at 701. The teacher, Cheryl Perich, was a "called teacher," which meant that she
was a commissioned minister. Id. at 700. Perich worked as a called teacher from 1999 to
2004. Id. In 2004, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy. Id. As a result of her illness, Perich
was put on disability leave at the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year. Id. However, in
January 2005, Perich informed the school that she could return to work. Id. The school
informed Perich that her teaching position had been filled by a lay teacher. Id. Further, the
school voted to release Perich from her called teacher position and asked her to resign. Id.
Perich refused to resign. Id. As a result, the school voted to terminate Perich's employment.
Id. In response, Perich filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
alleging that the school violated the discrimination provisions of the Americans with
Disability Act by firing her. Id. at 701. The EEOC brought suit, and Perich intervened. Id.
116. Id. at 699.
117. Id. at 707.
118. The Court noted that the ministerial exception is not a jurisdictional bar; instead, it
is a defense on the merits. Id. at 709 n.4 ("We conclude that the exception operates as an
affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.").
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discrimination laws."' The court said that members of religious
organizations put their faith in their ministers' hands.'2 0 As such, in the
words of Chief Justice Roberts,
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or
punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a
mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an
unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments. According the state the power
to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also
violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.121
The court also disagreed with the EEOC's contention that Smith's neutral
principles of law approach governed the case.' 22 In so disagreeing, the Court
recognized a distinction between the government's regulation of an
individual's outward physical acts-such as the ingestion of peyote in
Smith-and a church's selection of its ministers. 2 3 The Court said that
Hosanna-Taborinvolved "government interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself."' 24 Therefore,
the First Amendment barred the government's intereference.125

119. Id. at 705. The Circuit Courts of Appeal have long recognized a ministerial
exception. Id. at 705 n.2 (citing Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575,
1578 (1st Cir. 1989); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-09 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-07 (3d Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213
F.3d 795, 800-01 (4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343,
345-50 (5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225-27 (6th Cir.
2007); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008); Scharon v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991); Werft v. Desert
Southwest Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100-04 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal
Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655-57 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301-04 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455,
460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
120. Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 706.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 707.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.

THE ART OF ECCLESIASTICAL WAR

2012]1

547

Finally, and important to the church dispute context of this Comment, the
Court said that the ministerial exception-at this time-applies only in an
employment discrimination lawsuit.12 6 Specifically, the Court stated, "We
express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including
actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their
religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of
the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise."127 This language
suggests that the Supreme Court's church dispute jurisprudence discussed in
Part II.C supra, which takes the neutral principles of law approach, has not
been overruled and is still applicable to church disputes.
III. THE PROBLEM OF CHURCH DISPUTES
This section of the Comment will examine three types of church
disputes: pastoral, membership, and property.12 8 The pastoral disputes
section examines the legal liabilities for misconduct by the pastor and the
termination of the pastor. The membership disputes section examines the
rights and authority of members of a church and the legal ramifications of
church discipline. The property disputes section examines property
disputes and the differing court remedies. An overarching problem with
church disputes is the proper role of the courts in presiding over
predominately religious questions; this problem is examined by looking at

126. Id. at 710 ("The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on
behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision to fire her. Today we hold only that
the ministerial exception bars such a suit.").

127. Id.
128. These types of church disputes were chosen because they are some of the most
prevalent church disputes. There are many other types of church disputes; however, it is
outside of the scope of this comment to fully discuss each type. This chart ranks the most
prevalent church disputes-filed in court-from 2000 to 2007:
2000
1

3

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Property

Employment

Sexual Acts

Sexual Acts

Property

Zoning

Employment

Property

Personal

Personal

Zoning

Injury

Injury

Employment Employment Employment
Personal

Personal

Injury

Injury

Property

Property

Employment Employment
Property

Zoning

Sexual Acts
Employment

4

Zoning

Sexual Acts

Sexual Acts

Sexual Acts

Sexual Acts

Zoning

Property

Zoning

5

Sexual Acts

Zoning

Property

Zoning

Personal

Personal

Personal

Personal

Injury

Injury

Injury

Injury

This chart is adopted, in whole, from: 4 HAMMAR, supranote 32, at § 10, 130 tbl.10-2.
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two different approaches courts have taken in light of the Supreme Court's
Free Exercise jurisprudence.
A. PastoralDisputes
The pastor is the spiritual leader of a church and can be compared to the
president of a non-religious organization. He is selected by the members of
the church and presides over the church's organization. Within this duty is
the potential for conflict and disputes.
1. Clergy Malpractice
One of the most prevalent claims against the pastor is the claim of clergy
malpractice.' 29 This concept has gained national attention through the
sexual misconduct of some Catholic priests."o According to the court in
Byrd v. Faber,"' clergy malpractice is the "failure to exercise the degree of
care and skill normally exercised by members of the clergy in carrying out
their professional duties."' 32 Because clergy malpractice is such a new
concept, few courts have addressed the issue."' Courts that have decided
clergy malpractice claims have found that the "principle problem courts
face with clergy malpractice is defining suitable conduct without interfering
with the religious institution's free exercise rights."' In the case of Schmidt
v. Bishop,"' the court stated that "[i]t would be impossible for a court or
jury to adjudicate a typical case of clergy malpractice, without first
ascertaining whether the cleric . . . performed within the level of expertise

expected of a similar professional."3 6 However, another court held that as
long as the court does not consider the religious beliefs and remains neutral,
it can properly decide cases that involve clergy misconduct."' The court
went on to say that because of the "differing theological views espoused by
the myriad of religions in our state ... it would certainly be impractical, and
quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care on pastoral
129. John P. Hamm, In Defense of the Church, 33 U. OF LOUISVILLE J.OF FAM. L. 705, 706
(1995).
130. Id. at 707; see, e.g., Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Ca.
Ct. App. 1986); Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 472 A.2d 531 (N.J. 1984).
131. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991).
132. Id. at 586.
133. See Hamm, supra note 129, at 716-17.
134. Id. at 717.
135. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
136. Id. at 327.
137. Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960-61 (Cal. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
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counselors.""' This does not require the court to disregard the illegal
actions of clergy misconduct. 3 9 Ultimately, the First Amendment is a
defense against clergy malpractice suits that do not involve illegal activity
because the courts would have to decide the legitimacy of pastoral
counseling advice. 4 0 The Supreme Court has stated that "[men] may not be
put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs . . .. If one could be

sent to jail because a jury. . . found those teaching false, little indeed would
be left of religious freedom." 4 1
2.

Employment Disputes

Churches can terminate a pastor's employment at any time and without
cause as long as the pastor is not under contract and the church follows set
procedures.14 2 The Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor suggests
that a church's hiring and firing decisions cannot be reviewed by a court
because of the ministerial exception.4 3 But, in the case of an employment
contract, the church may not discharge the pastor without good cause;'" the
Court expressly declined to apply the ministerial exception to employment
contracts in Hosanna-Tabor.
If the church votes to terminate the employment of a pastor and they do
not have good cause, they will be held legally liable and the discharge is not
viable."' For good cause to be proved, the church must be able to produce
"competent and convincing evidence." 4 6 The Serbian case is an example of
a church dismissing the bishop of the church without good cause; the
church was held legally liable because the dismissal was arbitrary.4
138. Id. at 960.
139. See Hamm, supra note 129, at 709.
140. 1 HAMMAR, supra note 33, at § 4-05, 256.
141. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
142. Watts v. Greater Bethesda Missionary Baptist Church, 154 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. 1958).
143. The Court stated,
The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church's decision to fire a
minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the
faithful-a matter "strictly ecclesiastical"-is the church's alone.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012)
(citing Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S.
94, 119 (1952))(internal citations omitted).
144. See 1 HAMMAR, supra note 33, at § 2-02, 61-62.
145. Id.
146. Id. at § 2-02, 61.
147. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
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B. Member Disputes
Because church members are vested with considerable power within the
church, membership must be clearly defined. Courts have found that
members of a church enter into an agreement with the church, give a
profession of faith in the church's beliefs, adhere to the doctrines set forth
by the church, and submit to the church's form of government."'
Membership is determined by the church's bylaws."' Churches are
permitted to determine the standing of members within the church in
relation to church discipline, and the church's decision is binding on the
courts.o50
Church discipline is used by churches to deter adverse moral behavior
that is undertaken by a member of the church. Guidelines for church
discipline are set forth in the bylaws of the church and should be followed
to prevent any possible legal action. Courts have viewed church
membership as a matter of contract, and because of this, the church
members are under the discipline of the church."' The court in Hester v.
Barnett"' stated, "The consent to submit to the discipline of the church ...
is one of contract, therefore, between the member and the religious
body.""' Church discipline also involves the removal of members from the
church.
According to Bagley v. Carter,a church may develop rules that govern
the removal of members, and the rules are binding on the church's
members."' Some state courts have ruled that the removal of church
members falls within the authority of ecclesiastical beliefs, and the courts
cannot review the decision."' By joining a church, the member is
consenting to an implied contract that binds him to the authority of the

148. See Freshour v. King, 345 P.2d 689, 696 (Kan. 1959); Henson v. Payne, 302 S.W.2d
44, 51 (Mo. 1956); Second Baptist Church v. Mount Zion Baptist Church, 466 P.2d 212, 216
(Nev. 1970); W. Conference of Original Free Will Baptists v. Creech, 123 S.E.2d 619, 627
(N.C. 1962).
149. 2 HAMMAR, supra note 33, § 6-02.2, at 80.
150. Id. § 6-09.1, at 202; see also Rodyk v. Ukranian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, 296
N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968); Stewart v. Jarriel, 59 S.E.2d 368, 370 (Ga. 1950);
Fast v. Smyth, 527 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Mo. 1975); Eisenberg v. Fauer, 200 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751
(N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
151. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 795 (Ok. 1989).
152. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. 1987).
153. Id. at 559.
154. Bagley v. Carter, 220 S.E.2d 919, 920 (Ga. 1975).
155. See 2 HAMMAR, supra note 33, § 6-09.1, at 202-03.
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church, and he is held to the authority of the church's decisions."s6 In the
majority of states, courts can review the removal of a member if it interferes
with civil, contract, or property rights; if it does not comply with church
bylaws; and if it is based upon fraud.'
C. PropertyDisputes
Church property disputes most often arise when there is a church
dispute that results in the church splitting into two separate groups.' As a
result, each group claims to be the rightful possessor of the Church's
property, which usually results in a lawsuit to determine the rightful owner
of the property.' These disputes can arise "between either local and
national organizations, or local factions, one of which may be allied to a
national group."' 6 0 These organizations are usually one of two types of
religious bodies: hierarchical or congregational.' 6 ' The Roman Catholic
Church is an example of a hierarchical church organization, which
centralizes church government in a hierarchical system.'62 Congregational
churches, on the other hand, do not have a hierarchical organizational
structure. 6
The type of church organization is important because the Supreme Court
has put forth two differing standards regarding church property disputes:
the hierarchical deference approach and the neutral principles of law
approach." The hierarchical deference approach, which was created by the

156. Id. § 6-10.1, at 210.
157. Id. § 6-09.1, at 204.
158. See Greenawalt, supra note 84, at 1843.
159. Id. at 1843-44.
160. Id. at 1844.
161. A GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAw 28 n.1 (Lloyd J. Lunceford gen. ed., 2006); see,
e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979).
162. Id.at28n.1.
163. Id.
164. The Supreme Court's two differing tests are important for more than church
property disputes. In fact, these two standards are used to resolve all church disputes; the
Court either recognizes that the dispute involves a religious question and defers to the
religious organization's judgment, or the Court applies the neutral principles of law
approach. Compare Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871) (stating that civil courts should
not decide matters concerning "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical
government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals
required of them. . . ."), with Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 607 (1979) (neutral principles of
law).
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Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones,165 requires courts to defer to hierarchical
organizations in respect to religious matters. The Watson Court said,
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize
voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and
dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals
for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the
individual members, congregations, and officers within the
general association, is unquestioned.'"
The Court further reasoned that permitting courts to make decisions
regarding religious matters already decided by hierarchical church
government would undermine religious autonomy.'
In contrast to the hierarchical deference approach, the neutral principles
of law approach is the same standard discussed in supra Part II.C. As a
result of the Supreme Court's lack of a bright-line test for church property
disputes-or any church dispute for that matter-the state courts have
either adopted the deference test, the neutral principles of law test, or a
hybrid test.'"

165. Watson, 80 U.S. 679.
166. Id. at 728-29.
167. Id. at 729 ("But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of
such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the
secular courts and have them reversed.").
168. Mark Strasser, When Churches Divide: On Neutrality, Deference, and
Unpredictability,32 HAMLINE L.REv. 427, 454 (2009)
The Court's analysis of the constitutional limitations imposed on the states with
respect to their involvement in church matters suggests that no one method of
adjudication is constitutionally required. States can adopt a deferential . . .
approach in which they simply defer to the decision of the religious authorities
with respect to who owns particular property or they can use the neutralprinciples-of-law approach suggested in Jones [v. Wo!f]. Further, while
suggesting some of the considerations that would be appropriate when using
the neutral principles-of-law approach, the Court has not explained whether
any particular factor is dispositive or what weights should be assigned to the
differing factors. This lack of direction has led to much disparity among states
when deciding religious property issues.

Id.
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IV. THE BIBLE, THE COURTS, AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Now that the history, background, and current issues of church disputes
have been examined, it is necessary to analyze the use of the court system in
the resolution of church disputes. This section proposes: (1) a new
approach to biblical dispute resolution; (2) a restatement of the Supreme
Court's neutral principles of law test; and (3) an alternative to the legal
system for the resolution of church disputes.
A. BiblicalPerspective
For Christians, a problem arises when the legal system is advocated to
resolve church disputes. This problem is set out in I Corinthians 6:1-8:
Does any one of you, when he has a case against his neighbor,
dare to go to law before the unrighteous and not before the
saints? Or do you not know that the saints will judge the world?
If the world is judged by you, are you not competent to
constitute the smallest law courts? Do you not know that we will
judge angels? How much more matters of this life? So if you have
law courts dealing with matters of this life, do you appoint them
as judges who are of no account in the church? I say this to your
shame. Is it so, that there is not among you one wise man who
will be able to decide between his brethren, but brother goes to
law with brother, and that before unbelievers?
Actually, then, it is already a defeat for you, that you have
lawsuits with one another. Why not rather be wronged? Why not
rather be defrauded? On the contrary, you yourselves wrong and
defraud. You do this even to your brethren.16 1
The text of I Corinthians 6:1-8 does not give commands. Instead, Paul poses
a series of questions to the church on the topic of lawsuits against fellow
believers. The text, on its face, however, does not affirmatively forbid
believers from suing one another.
Paul wrote the letter of I Corinthians to the church in Corinth, Greece.' 70
The church at Corinth was "[u]nable to fully break with the culture from
which it came .

immaturity."'

.

. was exceptionally factional, showing its carnality and

The church developed factions that were loyal to different

169. 1 Corinthians6:1-8 (NASB95).
170. JOHN MACARTHUR, MAcARTHUR STUDY BIBLE 1694 (2006).
171. Id. at 1694-95.
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17
church leaders, and this caused a great amount of disunity.2
Paul expressed
his discontent with the members of the Corinthian Church because they
were using the secular courts to resolve their disputes, instead of taking
their disputes before the church.17 1 Paul's primary concern was that the
church members were taking each other to secular courts over trivial
matters.174 Paul said that they should suffer wrongs that are trivial rather
than resort to secular courts."'
John Calvin, in his interpretation of I Corinthians 6:1-8, wrote that
Christians should use the legal system as a last resort, but he did not
discount its usage altogether.'76 Calvin believed that the legal system can
and should be used as long as its usage does not violate the words of Jesusto love God and your neighbor.'77 Matthew Henry, in his interpretation of I
Corinthians 6:1-8, wrote that when the dispute is over something more than
a mere trivial matter, the legal system may be used:

In matters of great damage to ourselves or families, we may use
lawful means to right ourselves. We are not bound to sit down
and suffer the injury tamely, without stirring for our own relief;
but, in matters of small consequence, it is better to put up with
the wrong.17
The viewpoint espoused by many Christians, as a result of their
misunderstanding of I Corinthians 6:1-8, is that believers should never sue
one another. The text of I Corinthians 6:1-8, and the Scripture, as a whole,
does not support this viewpoint.'79 This viewpoint is inconsistent with the
biblical understanding of authority: "God has established civil courts and
expects his people to respect their authority and cooperate with them in
appropriate situations."'o Therefore, the legal system's usage is not
172. Id. at 1695.
173. KEN SANDE, THE PEACEMAKER 53 (3d ed. 2004).
174. MATTHEW HENRY, MATTHEW HENRY'S COMMENTARY ON THE WHOLE BIBLE 429
(1991).
175. Id.

176. Joseph Allegretti, "In All This Love Will Be The Best Guide": John Calvin on the
Christian'sResort to the Secular Legal System, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 10 (1991).
177. Id. at 12; see Luke 10:27.
178. HENRY, supra note 174, at 429.
179. See 1 Corinithians 6:1-8 (NASB95); Matthew 18:17 (NASB95); Romans 13:1-7
(NASB95).
180. See SANDE, supra note 173, at 281; see, e.g., Romans 13:1-7:
Every person is to be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no
authority except from God, and those which exist are established by God.
Therefore whoever resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God; and
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altogether forbidden by the Bible as long as the biblical dispute resolution
framework is followed.
The Bible provides a step-by-step framework for the resolution of church
disputes. The framework is set forth in Matthew 18:15-17, which says,
If your brother sins, go and show him his fault in private; if he
listens to you, you have won your brother. But if he does not
listen to you, take one or two more with you, so that BY THE
MOUTH OF TWO OR THREE WITNESSES EVERY FACT
MAY BE CONFIRMED. If he refuses to listen to them, tell it to
the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, let him
be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.1 8 '
Therefore, Matthew 18:15-17 presents a four-step process that should be
completed to properly resolve church disputes. The first step is for the
wronged to speak privately with the wrongdoer. If this does not resolve the
dispute, the second step is for the wronged to bring one or two objective
people along with him to confront the wrongdoer. If this does not resolve
the dispute, the third step is for the wronged to bring the dispute before the
they who have opposed will receive condemnation upon themselves. For rulers
are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no
fear of authority? Do what is good and you will have praise from the same; for it
is a minister of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be afraid; for it
does not bear the sword for nothing; for it is a minister of God, an avenger who
brings wrath on the one who practices evil. Therefore it is necessary to be in
subjection, not only because of wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For because
of this you also pay taxes, for rulers are servants of God, devoting themselves to
this very thing. Render to all what is due them: tax to whom tax is due; custom
to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor."
(NASB95); 1 Peter 2:13-14 ("Submit yourselves for the Lord's sake to every human
institution, whether to a king as the one in authority, or to governors as sent by him for the
punishment of evildoers and the praise of those who do right.") (NASB95). In Acts 24:2-4,
Paul submits to the secular legal system, and the verse says:
After Paul had been summoned, Tertullus began to accuse him, saying to the
governor, "Since we have through you attained much peace, and since by your
providence reforms are being carried out for this nation, we acknowledge this
in every way and everywhere, most excellent Felix, with all thankfulness."
(NASB95); Acts 25:10-11:
But Paul said, "I am standing before Caesar's tribunal, where I ought to be
tried. I have done no wrong to the Jews, as you also very well know. If, then, I
am a wrongdoer and have committed anything worthy of death, I do not refuse
to die; but if none of those things is true of which these men accuse me, no one
can hand me over to them. I appeal to Caesar." (NASB95).
181. Matthew 18:15-17 (NASB95).
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Church for resolution. If this does not resolve the dispute, the wrongdoer is
to be removed from the Church and is to be treated as a non-believer: "[A]s
indicated in I Corinthians 5:1-13 . . . a person should not be considered to

be part of the church if he or she has been removed from the fellowship
through official church discipline."'8 2 As a result, the wrongdoer is no
longer a "believer" as used in I Corinthians 6:1-8, I Corinthians 6:1-8 does
not apply to him, and the wronged may seek a resolution of the dispute in
the secular court system.'
The biblical framework is not only applicable to church disputes
involving church members, but it should also be used for church disputes
where the church is the wrongdoer. Church organizations should not be
shielded from liability for their harmful conduct simply because they are an
organized body of Christians. Instead, the church organization should be
taken through the same biblical framework if it has caused harm. For
example, if a pastor defrauds church members, the church cannot be
allowed to act as a liability shield-the church, as well as the pastor, must be
held accountable for the harm caused. If the church refuses to follow the
biblical dispute resolution framework, it must be treated "as a Gentile and a
tax collector."'" In accord with this, a church that refuses the Matthew 18
mandate can-and should-be sued for its harmful conduct.
B.

Why, and When to, Use the Courts?

* The main problem in advocating the use of the court system for the
resolution of certain types of church disputes is deciding when it is
appropriate. The use of the court system is not appropriate in all cases of
church disputes. When the matter that needs to be resolved is a matter of
biblical morality within the church-adultery, alcohol, relationships-the
legal system is not needed; these matters can be handled through ordinary
church discipline. However, the legal system should be used when the
dispute involves, in the words of the Supreme Court, "neutral principles of
law."'" As mentioned in supra Part IV.A, the government, in the Bible, is
given jurisdiction in appropriate situations.8 6 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has not set forth a clear standard; therefore, a bright line rule needs to
87
be developed to determine when courts can intervene.
182. See SANDE, supra note 173, at 281.
183. Id.
184. Matthew 18:15-17 (NASB95).

185. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
186. See supra Part IV.A.
187. See supra Part III.C.
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1. Redefining Neutral Principles of Law
The Supreme Court has not decided a church dispute case since Jones v.
Wolf18 in 1979. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence is not clear about the
appropriate standard to apply to a church dispute case, and the state courts
have split on the appropriate standard to apply in any given case.18 9 This
ambiguity in church dispute jurisprudence precipitates the need for a
clarification of the existing neutral principles of law test.190 The Supreme
Court's neutral principles of law test is the appropriate test to apply to
church disputes; however, the test needs to be clarified and consistently
applied.
To clarify the neutral principles of law test, neutral principles must be
defined. Neutral principles can be defined quite simply as any matter that
does not ask the court to decide a question of religious doctrine.
Unfortunately, this definition, by its very nature, is ambiguous. To
counteract the ambiguity, neutral principles includes any legitimate, legal
cause of action. Therefore, neutral principles, in tort law, would include a
claim for: assault, battery, false imprisonment, defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, etc. The underlying premise of this proposal
is that a church should not be able to escape liability for a social harm
merely because it claims that the harm it caused was a result of its exercise
of religion. Simply put, an intentional tort is not an exercise of religion.
The operating premise of courts that refuse to decide cases involving
religion is that no matter the underlying claim-a claim for defamation, for
example-the court must decide a matter of religion. This is simply not
true. While the claim may involve religious actors-the church, pastor, and
parishoners-the claim itself is not religious in nature. Returning to the case
in the introduction section of this Comment, one can see that the claim,
defamation, was not religious. The defamation claim was a secular cause of
action. Therefore, a court can adjudicate the claim. On the other hand, if
the party asked the court to decide a matter of religion-whether Jesus is
the Son of God-then the court clearly cannot adjudicate that claim.
Courts are confused on this essential question: where do questions of
religious doctrine end, and where do neutral principles of law begin? This
question must be answered by the church itself. Church bylaws can be used
in this regard. If a church wants to protect something as a matter of
188. Jones,443 U.S. 595.
189. See supra Part III.C.
190. See supra Part III.C for an example of the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's current
test.
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19
religion, then it must include that item in its governing documents. '
However, the protection granted by this method cannot exclude legitimate,
secular causes of action. A church should not be granted blanket immunity
from civil prosecution simply because it asserts that a claim touches upon a
question of religion. This is where the proposed test shines. As long as the
claim does not require a court to answer a question of religious doctrine,
the court can hear the case. The proposed test is best demonstrated by a
hypothetical case study.

2. The Art of Ecclesiastical War: A Hypothetical Case Study
First Baptist Church of Illian (hereinafter "FBC") hired Rand to be its
pastor. In traditional Baptist fashion, the church body voted on whether to
hire Rand. Three-fourths of the church membership voted for Rand. Rand
did not sign an employment contract; however, the nature of the
relationship created an implied employment contract.19 2 Rand and FBC
agreed on an initial employment term of five years. Rand would be paid
$50,000 per year.
In the first two years of Rand's employment, FBC's membership
increased from 250 to 1,000. The church budget, which operated in the
negative for the five years preceeding Rand's employment, was balanced,
and a building expansion project was underway. Unfortunately, change
often breeds contempt from the "old guard."19 3
Some of the members that voted against Rand's hiring as pastor were not
happy with the changes at FBC (hereinafter "the coterie"). The coterie met
in secret and formulated a plan to halt, and reverse, the change. Eventually,
the coterie convinced the Chairman of the Deacons, Perrin, of their plan.
Perrin met with Rand and presented him with his options: Rand could
191. The church governing documents include constitution, bylaws, covenants, the Bible,
etc. These documents establish matters of religion. Anything that falls outside of these
documents cannot be considered a matter of religion.
192. Unfortunately, most Pastors do not sign written employment contracts. According
to Richard Hammar, "[olften, a contract of employment will be implied between a church
and its minister if no written agreement was signed." 1 HAMMAR, supra note 31, at § 2-02, 58.
Additionally, "the absence of a written contract is completely immaterial; the conduct of the
parties clearly indicates an agreement to retain [the] plaintiff as pastor until his dismissal by
the church." Vincent v. Raglin, 318 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Mich. 1982).
193. New pastors bring change. Some church members expect the new pastor to keep the
status quo. Perhaps Shaw said it best: "[tihe only man who behaved sensibly was my tailor:
he took my measure anew every time he saw me, whilst all therest went on with their old
measurements and expected them to fit me." GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN;
A COMEDY AND A PHILOSOPHY 37 (1922).
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either conform to their plans-preach only on approved topics, cancel the
expansion plan, and not accept certain people into the church-or he would
be fired. In essence, Rand could either sit beneath the Sword of Damocles'
or be cast adrift in the sea of unemployment.
Rand discussed the situation with some of his closest friends in the
church. The friends gathered supporters. Thus, two competing groups were
formed. The coterie changed tactics; they spread false rumors about Rand.
The rumors said that Rand cheated on his wife and embezzled money from
the church. A majority of the church members believed the false rumors
and voted to terminate Rand's employment. The church split. Rand decided
to sue FBC. Rand's claims included breach of contract, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Because of the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's traditional neutral
principles approach, a lower court probably would not decide the claim
because it involves a religious dispute."' The proposed restatement of the
neutral principles test would allow courts to hear this case because it is a
matter that does not ask the court to decide a question of religiousdoctrine.
Rand's breach of contract claim involves an ecclesiastical matter-a
church's decision to fire one of its employees. However, ecclesiastical
matters are not synonymous with questions of religious doctrine. This is
where the courts have introduced ambiguity into the Supreme Court's
neutral principles test. Even though a claim involves an ecclesiastical
matter, a court can still hear that claim as long as the court does not decide
a question of religious doctrine. Rand's breach of contract claim is based
upon his employment termination. Without getting into the legal issues
surrounding a breach of contract claim, it is fairly obvious that the claim
does not involve a question of religious doctrine. The court is not being
asked to decide whether Rand's preaching accords with the church's beliefs;
instead, it is being asked to adjudicate a secular cause of action. A judge
deciding this case will not have to answer a question of religious doctrinethe only question the judge has to answer is whether there was a breach of
contract.
If the court is confronted with the issue of Perrin asking Rand to preach
only on approved topics, the court can still hear the case without deciding a
194. This phrase is derived from MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO'S TUSCULAN
DISPUTATIONS 185 (C.D. Yonge trans., Harper & Brothers 1877).
195. "The vast majority of lower federal courts and state courts have followed the general
rule of judicial noninterference in ecclesiastical disputes involving the dismissal of clergy,
and accordingly have ruled that the expulsion of a minister is an ecclesiastical matter that is
not reviewable by the civil courts." 1 HAMMAR, supra note 33, at § 2-04.1, 80.
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question of religious doctrine. The court does not have to examine the
preaching topics and decide which are appropriate-that would not be
allowed under either test. The court can decide whether Rand's failure to
agree to the coterie's review of the preaching topics is grounds for dismissal.
Once again, the claim touches upon an ecclesiastical matter, but it does not
require a court to decide a question of religious doctrine.
Finally, the defamation and IED claims do not require the court to
decide a question of religious doctrine. The same analysis in the breach of
contract claim should be applied to these claims. The court is not being
asked to decide a question of religious doctrine. The only time a court
should refuse to hear a church dispute claim is if the claim involves an
interpretation of religious doctrine.
As evidenced by this hypothetical, church disputes do not result in a
clear victor. When there is litigation, no one truly wins. FBC and Rand's
church dispute resulted in the split of a large church and costly litigation.
Church dispute litigation can be avoided with proper safeguardsspecifically, the implementation of an alternative dispute resolution
framework in a church's bylaws.
C. Alternative DisputeResolution
Alternative dispute resolution has two main subparts: mediation and
arbitration. Mediation consists of the involvement of one or more persons
who facilitate communication and reconciliation between two parties in
conflict."' The mediator is a neutral party who brings the parties together
and controls the communication. The mediator helps the parties explore
possible solutions to the dispute, but the parties are not obligated to follow
97
the results of the meeting or to follow the advice given by the mediator.'
The process of mediation is voluntary and is less confrontational than
litigation, which results in the relationship between the parties having a
higher likelihood of being reconciled.'" The major problem with mediation
is that the results of the process are not legally enforceable unless the parties
consent to it.'99 The other alternative is arbitration.
Arbitration is the process by which each party presents their case to a
neutral arbitrator, and each party is then legally bound to the decision of the

196. See SANDE, supra note 173, at 271.
197. Id.

198. Id.
199. Id.
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arbitrator.2 00 Arbitrators act like judges in that they listen to the evidence
and then make a decision based upon it. Arbitration always produces a
decision that is legally enforceable, usually cannot be disputed based upon
state statutes, and is a much quicker process than litigation.2 01 However,
arbitration ignores the relationship of the parties involved and often
aggravates the problem to the point that the two parties become further
estranged.202
This Comment proposes, as an alternative to using the court system, that
churches should implement a biblical approach to dispute resolution, which
incorporates the framework of Matthew 18:15-17 into an alternative dispute
resolution clause and includes mediation and arbitration. The problem with
this proposal is that it must be included in the church's charter, bylaws, or
constitution in order to be effective.203 In reality, the proposed ADR clause,
in the church's charter, bylaws, or constitution would prevent courts from
becoming involved in church disputes.2 0
To prevent court involvement in church disputes, the following ADR
Clause should be incorporated into a church's charter, bylaws, or
constitution:
Dispute Resolution Provision
Introduction. Any dispute arising out of the Church charter,
bylaws, or constitution; or any dispute between the Church and
Church Employees; or any dispute between the Church and
Church Members;20 or any dispute between Church Members,
shall be resolved according to the procedures set forth in Parts
A-E.
(A) Biblical Injunctions. The Members of this Church are
Christians that affirm the Biblical injunctions set forth in
Matthew 18:15-20 and 1 Corinthians 6:1-8. Therefore, any
Church dispute or claim, including claims under local law, state
law, federal law, common law, or statutory law, shall be settled

200. Id.
201. Id. at 272.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Whether a person is a Church Member is determined by the membership provisions
of the Church's Constitution and bylaws.
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based upon biblical dispute resolution standards, as set forth in
Parts B-E.
(B) Negotiation. The first step of dispute resolution shall be a
meeting with the parties involved in the presence of Church
leadership. 20 6 If the dispute is not resolved in the meeting with
Church leadership, the dispute shall be submitted to Mediation
in accordance with Part C.
(C) Mediation. If the dispute is not resolved by Negotiation, then
the dispute shall be submitted to Mediation. The Church shall
provide a non-Church affiliated mediator to resolve the dispute.
The rules for the mediation process shall be conducted in
accordance with [insert preferred rulebook here].207 If the dispute
is not resolved by Mediation, then the dispute shall be submitted
to Arbitration in accordance with Part D.
(D) Arbitration. If the dispute if not resolved by Mediation, then
the dispute shall be submitted to binding Arbitration. The
Church shall provide a panel of three non-Church affiliated,
independent, and objective, arbitrators. 20 8 The rules for the
arbitration process shall be conducted in accordance with [insert
preferred rulebook here].209
(E) Exclusive Remedy. All Church Members agree that the
process set forth in this provision shall be the sole remedy for
any dispute or claim. Additionally, all Church Members hereby
expressly waive any right to file a lawsuit in civil court, except to
enforce a legally binding arbitration provision, for any Church
dispute or claim, including claims under local law, state law,
federal law, and common law or statutory law.
206. Church leadership is to be determined by the specific Church's organizational
structure and should be inserted here.
207. Peacemakers, a Christian legal organization, has rules available for the mediation
process, which can be located in GUIDELINES FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, ver. 4.5 (03/05).

208. Preferably, this panel should consist of layperson lawyers, judges, or someone with
experience in the legal field in which the dispute takes place. In fact, a Christian arbitration
organization, which consists of lawyers and retired judges, should be created-if not already
in existence-and utilized in all church arbitration proceedings.
209. Peacemakers also has rules available for the arbitration process, which can be located
in GUIDELINES FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, ver. 4.5 (03/05).
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V. CONCLUSION

This Comment has put forth a restatement of the Supreme Court's
neutral principles test in order to provide courts with a clearer guidepost
when deciding church disputes. Additionally, this Comment has provided
an alternative to the courts with the alternative dispute resolution clause to
be inserted in church bylaws. The legal system is an objective arbiter of
disputes, and it should be used in order to remediate social harm caused by
churches. Under the proposed test, churches can no longer hide behind the
cloak of Free Exercise immunity.

